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section 5 considers further extensions of the analysis and section 6 concludes.
2. The model
The economy is represented as a standard general equilibrium model with perfect competition.
Two traded goods are produced using capital and two diﬀerent types of labour.
Consumers have identical tastes and own the same quantity of capital. They are endowed
with just one of the two types of labour required in production. Hence they can be divided
into two homogeneous categories according to the type of labour they oﬀer. The indirect utility
function for consumers of type i is
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where πj is the consumer price of good j, ωi is the consumer wage for labour of type i, and I
is lump-sum income, i.e.
I = (1 + ρ)K + b (2.2)
where ρ is the consumer interest rate, K is the capital endowment and b is a lump-sum tax or
subsidy. The population is normalised to 1 and n denotes the fraction of consumers of type 1.
As regards production, I assume constant returns to scale and rule out joint production. In
order to maintain mathematical tractability and to avoid complications that are of secondary
importance, I also assume that each type of labour is a sector-specific input, so that the same
superscript denotes both a productive sector and the type of consumer supplying labour in that
sector (hence i = 1, 2). Further, I adopt the non-restrictive convention that the producer wage
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is higher in sector 1 and refer to labour of type 1 as skilled labour.
The government implements a social welfare functional,
W
¡
nV
¡
π1, π2, ω1, I
¢
, (1− n)V
¡
π1, π2, ω2, I
¢¢
, (2.3)
through the uniform lump-sum transfer b and through taxes on both commodities and income
from productive factors.
Labour is internationally immobile. A tax on labour income inserts a wedge between con-
sumer and producer wages. Using Latin letters to denote producer prices:
ωi = wi (1− tL) (2.4)
where tL is the ad-valorem tax on labour income.
Capital is perfectly mobile across countries. Capital income is taxed in the country where
it originates according to the source principle. A source-based tax, tS , creates a wedge between
the rental rate of capital paid by domestic producers, r, and the world interest rate, r∗:
r = r∗ + tS . (2.5)
Traded goods are taxed where they are produced according to the origin principle. An
origin-based tax, tiO, imposes a wedge between the world price for good i, p
i∗, and the producer
price:
pi = pi∗ − tiO. (2.6)
The model can easily accommodate destination-based commodity taxes, which are paid
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where a good is actually sold. A destination-based tax, tjD, raises the consumer price above the
world price:
πi = pi∗ + tiD. (2.7)
By contrast, the static framework does not allow to analyse taxes on capital income levied in the
country where the recipient is located according to the residence principle. A residence-based
tax, tR, results in a wedge between the world interest rate and the return on capital received by
domestic consumers:
ρ = r∗ − tR. (2.8)
Given that consumers supply capital inelastically, a residence-based tax on capital income is
equivalent to lump-sum taxation. In section 5 I show that the model can readily be extended
to generate an elastic savings supply and that all the results hold when both optimal residence-
based capital taxes and destination-based commodity taxes are levied.
A final remark is needed to justify the absence of personalised lump-sum taxes. It is usually
argued that such taxes are infeasible since the government can directly observe neither the
individual wage nor the labour supply, but only labour income. However, when all the workers
of a specific type work in just one sector, optimal lump-sum taxes can be implemented without
knowing the individual type of worker by taxing skills at the firm level with diﬀerentiated wage-
bill taxes. Hence, in order to sustain the infeasibility of diﬀerential lump-sum taxation in the
present model, I must introduce the additional assumptions that the government cannot observe
the sector in which each individual works and that it cannot levy diﬀerentiated taxes on labour
at the firm level. These assumptions are clearly unrealistic but they are not restrictive since all
the results of the paper carry over to the more general case in which each sector uses both types
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of labour, as illustrated in section 5. An additional remark may further clarify the informational
structure of the model. The optimal tax formulas derived in the paper assume knowledge of wage
levels and elasticities, but only require anonymous information on the wage distribution at the
firm level. Such information is not suﬃcient, however, to implement optimal lump-sum taxation
since personalised lump-sum taxes can be levied only on the basis of the wage distribution at
the individual level.
3. Optimal linear taxation of labour
From (2.5) it is apparent that an increase in source-based taxes translates into an identical
increase in the producer interest rate, while leaving the consumer interest rate unaﬀected. As
a result, source-based taxes cannot redistribute income by exploiting diﬀerences in consumers’
saving behaviour as, for example in Haufler (1997) and Lopez et al. (1996). Nonetheless, the
change in the producer interest rate modifies the demand for labour and induces a variation
in equilibrium wage levels. Given constant returns to scale and no-joint production, the final
eﬀect on wages can be retrieved from the equilibrium conditions in production. The zero profit
conditions for the two sectors are
c1(w1, r) = p1 (3.1)
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= p2 (3.2)
where ci represents the unit cost function. In the absence of commodity taxes, producer prices,
pi, are equal to the given world price levels, so that equilibrium wages are functions of the
producer interest rate only. Implicit diﬀerentiation and application of Shephard’s lemma entail
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